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We examine a prominent justification for capital income taxation: goods preferred by those with high
ability ought to be taxed. In an environment where commodity taxes are allowed to be nonlinear functions
of income and consumption, we derive an analytical expression that reveals the forces determining
optimal commodity taxation. We then calibrate the model to evidence on the relationship between
skills and preferences and extensively examine the quantitative case for taxes on future consumption
(saving). In our baseline case of a unit intertemporal elasticity, optimal capital income tax rates are
2% on average and 4.5% on high earners. We find that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution has
a substantial effect on optimal capital taxation. If the intertemporal elasticity is one-third, optimal capital
income tax rates rise to 15% on average and 23% on high earners; if the intertemporal elasticity is
two, optimal rates fall to 0.6% on average and 1.6% on high earners. Nevertheless, in all cases that





























A prominent justi￿cation for positive capital income taxation is that goods preferred by high-ability indi-
viduals ought to be taxed because consumption of these goods provides a signal of individuals￿otherwise
unobservable ability. If individuals￿abilities are positively related to preferences for saving, this argument
implies that capital income should be taxed. The key exposition of this justi￿cation is Saez (2002). Saez
shows that a small linear tax on a commodity preferred by individuals with higher ability generates a smaller
e¢ ciency loss than does an increase in the optimal nonlinear income tax that raises the same revenue from
each individual. He applies this logic to capital income taxation and concludes that, assuming the discount
rate is negatively correlated with skills, interest income ought to be taxed. Importantly, Banks and Diamond
(2009) in the chapter on direct taxation in the Mirrlees Review use this justi￿cation as one of the essential
arguments for why policymakers ought to tax capital. Commissioned by the Institute for Fiscal Studies, the
Mirrlees Review is the successor to the in￿ uential Meade Report of 1978 and is the authoritative summary
of the current state of tax theory as it relates to policy. Their chapter concludes: "With the plausible
assumption that those with higher earnings abilities discount the future less (and thus save more out of
any given income), then taxation of saving helps with the equity-e¢ ciency trade-o⁄ by being a source of
indirect evidence about who has higher earnings abilities and thus contributes to more e¢ cient redistributive
taxation."
We study the case for taxing goods preferred by those with high ability when commodity taxes are
allowed to be nonlinear functions of both income and consumption. In particular, we focus on the taxation
of future consumption (i.e., saving). In other words, this paper addresses the question whether taxing capital
is a good or a bad idea in an environment with heterogeneous discount factors.1 We analytically show that
heterogeneity in preferences across goods adds a force calling for nonlinear taxation that discourages lower
earners from consuming a good preferred by high earners. These optimal distortions encourage e⁄ort among
high earners by threatening a larger distortion to their choices if they earn less. Quantitatively our main
￿nding is that, for a plausibly calibrated model, preference heterogeneity of this type recommends capital
income tax rates that are 2 percent on average, and converge to 4.5 percent for high incomes. Tax rates
can be substantially higher if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is lower. In all cases, however, the
welfare gains due to these capital income taxes are small. Our work is in the line of recent research, such
as Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006), Ales and Maziero (2009), Weinzierl (forthcoming), and Kocherlakota and
Pistaferri (2007, 2009), that uses micro level data to evaluate predictions of dynamic optimal policy models.2
Our speci￿c results are as follows. We ￿rst derive analytical expressions that determine the shape of
optimal commodity taxation. We start in a two-type, two-commodity economy and demonstrate that the
high ability type faces no distortion to its chosen commodity basket, while the low type faces a distortion
away from consumption of the good preferred by the high type. We show that this simple example illustrates
a key intuition: the distortion faced by a high type if it mimics a lower type is larger than the distortion the
1The answer of the survey by Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe 1998 in a Ramsey environment is "Taxing Capital Income: A Bad
Idea." Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger 2008 argue in a quantitiative OLG model with heterogeneous agents that "Taxing Capital?
Not a Bad Idea After All!". The New Dynamic Public Finance literature argues for a generally positive capital wedge (see, e.g.,
surveys by Golosov, Tsyvinski, and Werning 2006 and Kocherlakota 2010).
2See also Pavoni and Violante (2007) for an application of optimal insurance models to the design of welfare to work programs.
2high type faces if it truthfully reveals its type. We then examine an economy with two goods and a continuum
of types where the relative preference for one good rises with ability. As in Diamond (1998), Saez (2001), and
Golosov, Troshkin, and Tsyvinski (2010a,b), we analytically study the forces driving the optimal distortions
to commodity choices. Our analysis shows that the key force of optimal nonlinear commodity taxation in
this setting is that it discourages the consumption of a good preferred by high earners among lower earners.
The intuition is as follows. The goal of optimal tax policy (in the Mirrleesian framework) is to redistribute
from high-ability workers without discouraging their work e⁄ort. The optimal use of commodity taxation
then aims to increase the attractiveness of earning a high income. High-ability individuals will choose to
earn more if relative marginal commodity tax rates on the goods they most value generate distortions to
their consumption choices that are greater when they earn less. These distortions allow the tax authority
to levy higher income taxes on high-ability individuals and redistribute more resources to those with lower
ability.
We then examine the quantitative case for capital income taxation in this environment. We use data
from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to calibrate the relationship between ability3 and
intertemporal discounting, i.e., preferences for future relative to current consumption. This relationship
is distinct from that between income and intertemporal discounting, which has been the focus of most of
the relevant prior literature on preference heterogeneity. One exception is Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro
(2006), who ￿nd a positive relationship between ability and the holding of positive net assets, and our
results are consistent with theirs. An important paper by Cagetti (2003) analyzes a related question: the
relationship between education and time preferences. His ￿nding￿ that higher education groups exhibit
(substantially) greater preferences for saving￿ is consistent with the positive relationship between ability and
savings preferences that we uncover in the data. For a state of the art review of earnings, consumption and
life cycle choices, including environments with informational frictions, see the Handbook chapter by Meghir
and Pistaferri (forthcoming).
Our main ￿nding is that the computed optimal capital income tax rates for empirically plausible cal-
ibrations are as follows. For the baseline example of an intertemporal elasticity of substitution equal to
one, optimal rates are U-shaped in income up to a high wage and then plateau at approximately $150,000
of annual income.4 The optimal maximal capital income tax rate is everywhere less than 4.54%, and the
population-weighted average capital income tax rate is 2.0%. Welfare gains from these optimal capital income
taxes are negligible.
We show that these baseline results are robust to varying the form of the social welfare function and the
elasticity of labor supply. In contrast, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, which equals 1
￿ in our
model, has a substantial e⁄ect on optimal capital income tax rates. The baseline assumption of ￿ = 1 is a
standard benchmark in mainstream optimal tax and macroeconomic models. The smaller the intertemporal
3We measure ability by the survey respondent￿ s score on the cognitive ability portion of the Armed Forces Quali￿cation Test
(AFQT). While it is impossible to measure ability perfectly, the AFQT score is commonly used, such as in the study of the
returns to education.
4Each individual faces, in equilibrium, a distortion to consumption choices smaller than that if he earned less, consistent
with our analytical results. The simulations are performed with a bounded distribution, so there is a highest type. This highest
type faces no distortion, as shown analytically in Section 3. Whether rates decline with income for a range of types just below
the highest type depends on the speci￿cation of the population distribution.
3elasticity, the larger the optimal rates. For a low intertemporal elasticity (￿ = 3), optimal rates rise to
15.0% on average and 23.5% on high earners, while for a high intertemporal elasticity (￿ = 0:5) they rise to
only 1.6%. Even when sizeable capital income tax rates are optimal, however, they still yield small welfare
gains.
As an extension we also study optimal capital taxation in a stochastic setting in which there is a re-
lationship between ex post ability and preferences over goods consumed within a period. We show that
this relationship does not a⁄ect the optimal intertemporal distortion: i.e., the inverse Euler equation as in
Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003) continues to hold. Optimal distortions within the second period
are similar to the results from the static model.
The idea that goods preferred by the highly able ought to be taxed has a long history in tax research and
is a favorite of tax theorists. Nearly all comprehensive treatments of modern tax policy contain a section on
this result. For example, Tuomala (1991) writes "...the marginal tax rates on commodities that the more
able people tend to prefer should be greater;" Salanie (2003) warns "If there is a positive correlation between
the taste for ￿ne wines and productivity, then ￿ne wines should be taxed relatively heavily (God Forbid!);"
while Kaplow (2008) argues "it tends to be optimal to impose a heavier burden on commodities preferred
by the more able and a lighter burden on those preferred by the less able." No doubt the enthusiasm for
this result is due to the notion that, as Mirrlees put it "This prescription is most agreeable to common
sense." In other words, taxes on goods preferred by high-ability individuals contribute to progressivity and
the redistribution of income. The starting point in the literature for this idea is Mirrlees (1976, 1986), who
shows that goods preferred by the able ought to be taxed. His results are on the ratio of after-tax to pre-tax
prices for an individual￿ s marginal purchase of a good, so they impose no linearity or income-independence
constraints on optimal taxes. His results do not, however, tell us how these taxes ought to vary with the
distribution of abilities or the details of individual preferences. Perhaps in part to make progress along this
dimension, subsequent work often focused on linear, income-independent commodity taxes in the presence
of preference heterogeneity (such as Saez, 2002). Our analysis returns to the general Mirrleesian setting,
characterizing optimal policy analytically and, for capital taxation, quantitatively.
A contemporaneous analysis of this issue with a focus complementary to ours is Diamond and Spinnewijn
(2009).5 While we focus on the how preferences change with ability on average, they focus on heterogeneity
of preferences among individuals with the same ability. In their model, individuals sort into occupations
and the task of the tax authority is to use occupation-speci￿c linear capital taxation to ensure that high-
ability individuals of all preference types choose the high-productivity occupation. Because they assume
that individuals with higher discount rates also have a lower willingness to work, Diamond and Spinnewijn
￿nd that the tax authority should levy a linear capital tax on the high earners and a linear subsidy on the
low earners. This discourages the high-skilled, impatient workers from deviating to the low-productivity
occupation. While important, this result depends on the absence of an intensive margin of e⁄ort and on
the assumption of a positive relationship between discount rates and the willingness to work, which may
be di¢ cult to demonstrate with available empirical evidence. It also does not consider the possibility of
5Gordon and Kopczuck (2010) also ￿nd evidence to suggest including capital income in the tax function because of infor-
mation it carries about individuals￿wages.
4nonlinear capital taxation. The approach we take in this paper allows for nonlinear capital taxation and is
set in the standard Mirrleesian framework where individuals choose e⁄ort.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 provides an illustrative example of our theoretical results
in an economy with two ability types and heterogeneity in preferences over two goods. Section 2 derives
conditions on the optimal policy in a general model of optimal taxation with a continuum of ability types and
heterogeneity in preferences. In Section 3, we calibrate the model to data from the NLSY on heterogeneous
time preferences and calculate optimal distortions for a baseline setting. In Section 4 we extensively examine
the robustness of the baseline results to variation in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the labor
supply elasticity, and the form of the social welfare function. We also compare the estimated relationship
between ability and time preference to that which would be required for the prevailing capital income tax
rates of developed economies to be optimal. Section 5 considers the dynamic, stochastic model. An Appendix
contains technical details referred to in the text.
1 A simple example
In this section we introduce a simple two-type example that captures the main intuition behind the more
general model. We show that, in this setting, the optimal relative commodity tax discourages the consump-
tion by the low ability agents of the good preferred by the high ability agents. In particular, the relative
marginal tax (wedge) is positive on this good for the low-ability individual, while the high-ability individual
faces no distortion.
There is a continuum of measure one of two types of individuals indexed by i = fl;hg. The size of each
group is equal to 1=2. These individuals di⁄er in wage (skill) wi, where wh > wl > 0. The wage is private
information to the agent. There are two commodities. The consumption of each commodity by an agent of
type i is denoted by ci
1 and ci










where yi denotes the amount of output (income) produced by the agent. That is, the agent i provides the
amount of labor li ￿ 0 to produce output yi = wili ￿ 0. The planner observes output yi but not the





t=f1;2g ￿ 0 is also observable. Let ui
n be the
partial derivative of ui (c1;c2;l) with respect to the nth argument. Note that these marginal utilities, and
preferences in general, may depend on ability. We assume that ui
n > 0 for n = f1;2g and ui
3 < 0.
The planner￿ s problem is a mechanism design problem in which the mechanism assigns consumption and
income allocations to each wage type reported by agents. The planner designs the mechanism to maximize
a Utilitarian social welfare function.












































Constraint (2) is an incentive compatibility constraint stating that an individual of type i = h prefers










allocated to an individual of type i = l.6 Constraint (3) is feasibility, where we assume that the marginal
rate of transformation of consumption commodities is equal to the price ratio 1
p2.
Consider ￿rst a benchmark environment in which the wage wi is observable to the planner. Then the
constrained e¢ cient problem does not have the incentive compatibility constraint (2). The solution is an
undistorted consumption margin for both ability types ￿the marginal rate of substitution across commodities























for i = fl;hg.
Now, consider a program with unobservable wages. Let ￿ ￿ 0 be the multiplier on constraint (2). From
the ￿rst order conditions for consumption, we obtain the following expressions for the marginal rate of























































































Equation (5) shows that the consumption choices of the high-ability individual are undistorted. The





2(￿) is equal to the marginal rate of transformation, which is equal to 1
p2.
Equation (6) shows that if the multiplier ￿ on the incentive compatibility constraint is not equal to zero,
then the consumption choices of the low-ability individual may be distorted.
Now, suppose we impose a condition requiring that if all individuals are given the same consumption and
6Writing this constraint we assumed that only an individual of type i = h can misrepresent his type. This is easy to ensure
if the ratio wh=wl is high enough.
7The consumption-labor margin is also undistorted.
6income allocation, (c1;c2;y), the marginal utility of good 2 relative to good 1 is higher for the high-ability
individual (type i = h) than for the low-ability individual (type i = l). This condition on the relative shape
of indi⁄erence curves between goods for individuals of di⁄erent ability levels resembles that discussed by
Mirrlees (1976) in equation (37) of his treatment of this topic.8





























for any (c1;c2;y) ￿ 0.
The ￿rst order conditions (5) and (6), together with Assumption 1, imply a proposition characterizing
the distortions in the optimal allocation.





i=l;h is an optimal allocation solving (1) through (3). Then the op-
timal choice of consumption for the high-ability individual (i = h) is not distorted. Suppose that Assumption
1 holds. Then the optimal choice of consumption for the low-ability agent (i = l) is distorted away from good























This Proposition states that if good 2 is particularly enjoyed by high-ability workers, the planner should
impose a distortion (i.e., a positive relative tax)9 on the consumption of good 2 by the low-ability workers
(but not on consumption of that good by high-ability workers). The intuition for this result is as follows.
The planner wants to discourage a high-ability individual from deviating and claiming that he is a low type.
A high-ability agent ￿nds deviating less attractive if doing so causes him to face a positive relative tax on
the good that he values highly. The cost to the planner of such a positive relative tax is a distortion in the
consumption choices by the low-ability agent. Assumption 1 ensures that the costs of such distortion are
smaller than the gain from relaxing the incentive compatibility constraint.
It is important to be clear that this result depends on preferences varying by ability level, not income.
In particular, it does not apply to goods with an income elasticity of demand greater than one but for which
preferences are unrelated to ability. For those goods, the inequality in (7) would be an equality because
each type would have the same ratio of marginal utilities given the same consumption and income bundle.
Instead, the case for di⁄erential taxes requires the high-ability individuals to prefer good 2 even when at the
same income level as the low-ability individuals.
Related to Proposition 1, we now derive a second result characterizing the design of optimal nonlinear
commodity taxes. This result compares the distortions that individuals face under the optimal policy when
8Though Assumption 1 does not rule out complementarity of consumption and leisure, our results do not rely on that. In
fact, in the more general analysis below, we specify separability to highlight that our results are driven by the e⁄ects that
preferences have on the sub-utility from consumption goods. The alternative, in which some goods are more complementary to
labor than others, provides a second reason to deviate from uniform commodity taxation ￿rst discussed by Corlett and Hague,
1953.
9In this model, equilibrium wedges correspond to taxes for each type. We interchangeably use the terms wedges and taxes
to refer to these distortions.
7they reveal their type and when they mimic a lower type. We call the latter the "deviator￿ s distortion" to
contrast it with the distortion faced by individuals who truthfully reveal their types.
De￿nition 1 The "deviator￿ s distortion (i0ji)" is de￿ned as ￿i
























In words, this measures the distortion to the consumption choices of an individual of type i who reports
being of type i0 and receives the latter￿ s allocation of consumption and income.
We now state the following corollary.





i=l;h is an optimal allocation solving (1) through (3). Then the optimal
choice of consumption for the high-ability agent (i = h) is distorted away from good 2 in favor of good 1 more











































Proof. This result follows immediately from the previous Proposition and Assumption 1.
Corollary 1 helps with understanding the role of optimal commodity taxes and shows that the planner
encourages individuals to exert e⁄ort by threatening them with higher distortions to their consumption
choices if they earn less. The relevant distortions these individuals would face if they earned less are not the
distortions faced by lower-ability individuals who tell the truth about their type, because preferences di⁄er
with ability. Speci￿cally, because higher ability individuals prefer good 2 in our example, a distortion away
from good 2 as perceived by type i0 is perceived to be more distortionary by type i with wi > wi
0
. This
"deviator￿ s distortion (i0ji)" adds an incentive for high ability individuals to exert e⁄ort.
2 Model
In this section, we set up a model with a continuum of ability types, as in the classic Mirrlees (1971) frame-
work. Agents are heterogeneous in their preferences. We derive a formula for optimal relative commodity
taxes that are allowed to be nonlinear in consumption and to depend on income, and we explain the novel
components of this formula relative to models without preference heterogeneity.
There is a continuum of measure one of individual agents. Agents are indexed by i 2 [0;1]. Individuals
di⁄er in their abilities, which we measure with their wages, denoted by wi and distributed according to
the density function f (w) over the interval [wmin;wmax]. Ability is private information to the agent. Each










Utility is a function of the consumption of good 1, c1 ￿ 0, and the consumption of good 2, c2 ￿ 0, as well as
8of labor e⁄ort l ￿ 0.10 Superscripts i on consumption and labor denote the values of these variables for the
individual, and the partial derivatives of utility take the following signs: uc1 (￿) > 0; uc2 (￿) > 0; ul (￿) < 0.
The output yi = wili ￿ 0. Utility is also a function of the wage wi because we assume that preferences across
consumption goods are a function of ability. This assumption simpli￿es the planner￿ s problem by retaining
a single dimension of heterogeneity. Two or more dimensions introduce a multiple screening problem for
which a tractable analytical approach at this level of generality has not been developed.11 Later, we will






> 0 for all wi:
































dwi ￿ 0; (10)




















for all i;j 2 [0;1].
Constraint (11) is the incentive compatibility constraint ensuring that an individual of type i prefers the
consumption and income allocation intended for it by the planner to the allocations intended for any other
individual of type j. As in the previous section, the relative price of c2 is p2.
It is standard to rewrite the planner￿ s problem with explicit tax functions. To characterize the form of
these optimal tax functions, we follow the formal techniques of the Mirrleesian literature. We start with the
statement of the problem solved by each individual, who takes the tax functions as given.




























The budget constraint requires careful examination. The nonlinear income tax T
￿
wili￿
: R+ ! R





10Extending the model to more than two goods (for example, to more than two periods) is straightforward. The analytical
results on optimal distortions are direct analogues of those derived below.
11See Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2009), Tarkiainen and Tuomala (2007), and Judd and Su (2008) for discussions of the





: R+ ￿ R+ ! R are commodity tax functions that we also assume to be continuous and
di⁄erentiable. Importantly, note that we explicitly allow for the taxation of each commodity to be nonlinear
in consumption of that good and to depend on income.12 The budget constraint (13) has the multiplier
￿(i) ￿ 0.
In this approach, the social planner￿ s problem is as follows:






























dwi ￿ 0; (15)
and incentive compatibility, which is that each individual i 2 [0;1] solves the optimization problem in (12),












In words, the social planner chooses a tax system to maximize utilitarian social welfare subject to two
constraints. First, the budget constraint requires that total tax revenue be non-negative (we assume no
government spending for simplicity). Second, each individual will respond to the tax system by choosing
labor supply and a consumption bundle that maximize his or her utility.
2.1 The optimal commodity choice wedge
We now derive a formula that allows us to study the forces determining the optimal commodity wedge, i.e.,
the wedge distorting commodity choices. We formulate the Hamiltonian from the planner￿ s problem (9)
using the budget constraint, envelope condition, and ￿rst order condition with respect to labor li from the






























. The ￿rst term of the Hamiltonian is the utility of the individual with wage wi. The second




with respect to wi, as derived above, and is multiplied by the co-state variable ￿.13
To solve for the optimal policy, choose l and ci
1 as the control variables, with ci
2 an implicit function
de￿ned by the budget constraint. The ￿rst order condition with respect to ci
1 combined with the condition
12These tax instruments are notationally redundant, in that a single tax function of the consumption of one good and income
would be su¢ cient to characterize the full policy. Separating taxes into these functions aids interpretation and has no e⁄ect
on the analytical or quantitative results of the paper.
13The above procedure uses the so-called ￿rst order approach, where the ￿rst-order conditions of the individual￿ s problem
are assumed to be su¢ cient, not just necessary, conditions for a maximum. We check that these are su¢ cient in all numerical
simulations we perform in Section 3.
10that individuals will set the ratio of marginal utilities from the consumption goods equal to the price ratio










































To further characterize the optimal distortion to commodity purchases given by (17), we solve for the
multipliers ￿ and ￿
￿
wi￿
under the following assumption:














The following proposition derives an expression for optimal commodity taxes.






























































































































Using these results in expression (17), we obtain (19).
As with the conditions for optimal marginal income tax rates from, e.g., Diamond (1998), Saez (2001), and
Golosov, Troshkin, and Tsyvinski (2010b), expression (19) is not a fully closed-form solution as it depends
on optimal utility and consumption levels. Instead, it is a representation of the ￿rst order conditions of the
optimal problem allowing us to examine the forces a⁄ecting optimal taxes.
We identify three important forces at play. Two are familiar from previous results in Mirrleesian optimal
11taxation, for instance from the formulas for the income tax in Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001). However,
they have no impact in our model without the existence of an additional, novel, force.







are the derivatives of the marginal utility of consumption of goods 1 and 2 with respect to the wage. This







equal (for instance, if they are both zero), there is no distortion to consumption choices in the optimal policy.
If, instead, higher-ability workers relatively prefer good 2, then uwici
1 < 0 while uwici













are non-negative, the ratio on the right-hand
side of (19) is less than 1
p2, and the optimal distortion discourages marginal consumption of good 2. In other
words, preferences over goods that vary with ability introduce a reason for using di⁄erentiated marginal
commodity taxes to provide incentives for high-ability individuals to exert work e⁄ort.







as the wage level increases. Though a full characterization depends on the speci￿c







toward zero as the wage level increases, reducing the size of this distortion at higher
wages. Intuitively, marginal commodity tax rates that decline with income on the good more valued by
high-ability individuals will encourage them to earn more, allowing the tax authority to levy higher income
taxes on them and redistribute more resources to those with lower ability.
The two forces familiar from previous optimal tax analyses generate the ratio
C(w
i)
B(wi) in (19). This ratio
can be interpreted as the cost-bene￿t ratio of the distortion, so a higher value for it reduces the optimal










measures the redistributive bene￿t of a distortion at wage wi. That distortion allows the
planner to shift income from those with wages above wi to the population as a whole, raising total welfare.
Formally, consider a two-part perturbation in the planner￿ s allocations made possible by this distortion. First,
the planner lowers utility by 1 unit for each individual above wi by extracting consumption from them while











dwj in resources from this










units for each individual in the population by granting them additional consumption while preserving incen-




















units. The net change in social welfare from these two actions is zero,

































14Note that this action is possible only because of the distortion at wi. Otherwise, individuals above wi would respond by
earning less.
12so that the planner can raise social welfare through redistribution whenever B
￿
wi￿




), the more valuable is this distortion to the planner. Intuitively, higher-ability workers have
lower marginal utilities of consumption, and the more concave is utility in good 2 above wage wi, the more





measures the cost of the distortion at wage wi because it is the share of the population
whose choices are directly a⁄ected by a commodity tax at wi. When this share is low, the optimal consump-
tion distortion (if non-zero) is larger, as the planner wants to concentrate distortions on small sub-populations
all else the same. The ratio
C(w
i)







the undistorted marginal rate of transformation equals 1
p2:
We can derive several speci￿c results that characterize the optimum and aid intuition. First, for the top











so the commodity distortion is zero on the highest ability worker.15 Second, the distortion is also zero on
the lowest ability worker, as B (wmin) = 0. Third, if we restrict attention to commodity distortions that
are a linear function of the consumption of the good, an argument similar to Saez (2002) and Salanie (2003)
shows that goods preferred by the highly able ought to be taxed.
As in the two-type model of Section 1, we can clarify the way in which the optimal policy provides

























We will show in numerical simulations in Section 3 that the "deviator￿ s distortion (i0ji)" (i0 < i) discourages

















One may also be interested in the pattern of marginal tax rates on income that are the focus of the
conventional Mirrleesian optimal tax literature. In this paper￿ s multiple-commodity setting, the marginal
tax rate on income can be calculated relative to the distortion to consumption of one of the commodities.
In the Appendix, we derive an expression analogous to (19) that describes these relative marginal income
taxes. In addition, the numerical results of the next section can be used to calculate the optimal marginal
income taxes (relative to commodity consumption) implied by the data.
15If the ability distribution is unbounded, as argued by Saez (2001), the pattern of rates near the top of the distribution
depends on the speci￿cation of preferences. Formally, if A1 and A2 decrease quickly enough with wi, the optimal distortion
falls with wages as well.
133 Optimal capital income taxes in a calibrated model
The results of Sections 1 and 2 show the forces a⁄ecting optimal commodity taxation when preferences over
goods vary with ability. We now turn to a quantitative study of this topic when the commodities in the
utility function are current and future consumption (savings).
We begin our quantitative analysis of optimal capital income taxation by discussing the existing literature
on the relationship between time preferences and income. That relationship is distinct from the relationship
that matters for this paper: that between time preferences and ability. We provide a calibration of time
preferences by ability level (and thus wages) using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth.
We then simulate the optimal capital income taxes justi￿ed by these estimates and relate our results to the
analytical expression (19) from the previous section.
3.1 Calibrating the model
In this section, we calibrate the model of optimal commodity taxation from Section 2. In particular, we
estimate the relationship between time discounting and cognitive ability using panel data from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY).
A sizeable literature exists on measuring and explaining di⁄erences in saving behavior across income
groups.16 Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2004) ￿nd a "strong, positive relationship between saving rates and
lifetime income," using data from the PSID, but they argue that preference di⁄erences cannot explain their
￿ndings (at least, without a strong bequest motive). Lawrance (1991) calculates annual time preference rates
using data on food consumption and ￿nds that implied discount factors rise with income, but Dynan (1993)
shows that Lawrance￿ s results are sensitive to the inclusion of controls.
Less research exists on whether saving preferences are related to innate ability, the relationship of interest
for our analysis. One exception is Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro (2006), who use the same dataset we use
and ￿nd results consistent with ours, though they focus on a di⁄erent measure of the relationship between
preferences and ability. An intermediate case is an important paper by Cagetti (2003), who estimates discount
factors by education group using detailed micro data on income and wealth from the PSID and SCF. As
with income, educational attainment is likely to be a⁄ected by individuals￿time preferences, so Cagetti￿ s
estimates cannot directly be used to determine the relationship of interest in this paper. Nevertheless, his
￿nding that higher education groups exhibit (substantially) greater preferences for saving is consistent with
the positive relationship between ability and savings preferences that we uncover in the data.
With the goal of calibrating our model, we provide evidence on the relationship between saving preferences
and ability. In brief, our approach is to use data on income and net worth from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY) and a standard model of an individual￿ s intertemporal utility maximization problem
to compute a discount factor for each individual in the sample. Next, we regress these discount factors on
the log of ability and other personal characteristics observed by the NLSY, where we measure ability with
individuals￿scores on a widely-used aptitude test. The coe¢ cient on ability in this regression allows us to
16For example, see Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995). A related literature focuses on the consequences of these di⁄erences
for the extent of self-insurance against shocks. See Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008), for example.
14predict, holding ￿xed other personal characteristics, a discount factor for each level of ability. Using NLSY
data on wages by ability level, we are then able to estimate a functional relationship between discount factors
and wages, the key inputs to our policy simulations. To summarize, we estimate an elasticity of the annual
discount factor ￿ to the wage w of 0.0036. For example, a change in the wage from $20 to $24 per hour,
a 20 percent increase, corresponds to a change in the annual discount factor from 0.9604 to 0.9610, a 0.07
percent increase.
Throughout the numerical analysis, we use the following utility function. For consistency with the previous
section, we consider a utility function that is separable in consumption and labor. Preferences over goods
are normalized so that they do not mechanically a⁄ect labor e⁄ort, as detailed in the Appendix. In addition,
we assume that utility from consumption is constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and the disutility from

















































We now provide some more details on our calibration, beginning with the data. The NLSY consists of a
nationally representative sample of individuals born between 1957 and 1964, ￿rst interviewed in 1979, and
interviewed annually or biannually since. The NLSY contains data on individuals￿net worth and income
over time, allowing us to roughly estimate saving rates as described below.
The key advantage of the NLSY for our purposes is that it includes a direct measure of ability. This
allows us to relate a measure of ability, not income, to time preferences. In 1980, the NLSY administered the
Armed Forces Quali￿cation Test (AFQT) to 94 percent of its participants. This test measured individuals￿
aptitudes in a wide range of areas, including some mechanical skills relevant to military service.
We use an aggregation of scores in some of the areas covered by the AFQT as the indicator of ability
for each head of household whose family income and net worth we will measure.17 This aggregation, the
AFQT89, is calculated by the Center for Human Resource Research at Ohio State University, as follows:
Creation of this revised percentile score, called AFQT89, involves (1) computing a verbal
composite score by summing word knowledge and paragraph comprehension raw scores; (2) con-
verting subtest raw scores for verbal, math knowledge, and arithmetic reasoning; (3) multiplying
the verbal standard score by two; (4) summing the standard scores for verbal, math knowledge,
and arithmetic reasoning; and (5) converting the summed standard score to a percentile.
Our measure of preferences is based on the discount factor ￿ implied by using NLSY data on individuals￿
17The AFQT most likely measures some combination of innate ability and accumulated achievement. To the extent that
more innately patient individuals invest more in human capital and thereby have higher AFQT scores because of achievement,
not ability, our analysis will be biased toward ￿nding a stronger relationship between ability and time preferences than that
which truly holds.
15household income paths and net worth in a simple model of optimization described in the Appendix. Intu-
itively, the higher is ￿nal net worth relative to the cumulative value of income, the greater the estimated ￿.18
To give a sense for the data, in Table 1 we show the mean and standard deviations of ￿ by AFQT quintile.
Table 1. Summary of ￿ by AFQT quintile
AFQT quintile
Bottom 2 3 4 Top
Mean ￿ 0.336 0.374 0.394 0.418 0.466








0.9536 0.9581 0.9603 0.9628 0.9673
Mean wi 12.35 16.29 18.98 21.67 25.39
Table 1 also shows the implied values of ￿
￿
wi￿




, the standard annual discount factor.19 The variation in ￿ within AFQT quintiles is large relative
to the variation across wage levels. These results have their limitations for use in calibrating our model. The
data are likely to be very noisy, and our inference of ￿ is based on a simpli￿ed model. Moreover, simple
AFQT quintile means of ￿ are likely to be misleading, as they fail to control for variables correlated with
both ability and saving behavior.
Table 2 shows the results of a regression of ln(￿) on ability as well as other observable characteristics. In
particular, we control for the cumulative value of family income over the head of household￿ s working life,
the head￿ s age, age squared, and gender.20 Formally, we estimate:
ln￿ = ￿1age + ￿2age2 + ￿3gender + ￿4 ln(income) + ￿5 ln(AFQT):
where the calculation of "income" is described in the Appendix.
18We lack data on families￿expected future income ￿ows from sources such as Social Security and bequests. To the extent
that these ￿ows are greater relative to past income for low earners, we are underestimating the true ￿ for low earners and
thereby overestimating the strength of the relationship between ability and savings preferences. If these ￿ows are greater for
high earners, we are underestimating the relationship￿ s strength. Similarly, we do not take into account the existing tax system
when estimating ￿. If capital income tax rates are progressive, this will cause us to underestimate the positive relationship
between ability and savings preferences.
19Note that, because the model with which we estimate ￿ uses 23-year periods, ￿ is the discount factor across these periods.
The Appendix describes how to convert ￿ into the preference parameter ￿
￿
wi￿
from the utility function (25).
20The estimate of the coe¢ cient on ln(AFQT) is 2.71E-02 (4.45E-03) if we do not control for age, age squared, or gender.
16Table 2. Regression results
Variable Coe¢ cient Std. Err. t-statistic
age -2.62E-02 2.97E-02 -0.88
age2 8.80E-04 8.36E-04 1.05
gender 1.16E-02 8.15E-03 1.42
ln(income)
￿￿ 1.69E-01 7.61E-03 22.15
ln(AFQT)
￿￿ 2.60E-02 4.46E-03 5.82




This regression yields a highly signi￿cant estimate for ￿5 of 0.026 (standard error of 0.004).21;22 In words,
this coe¢ cient implies an elasticity of 0:026 for the discount factor ￿ with respect to ability as measured by
the AFQT. For example, if ability increases by 10 percentile points from 50 to 60 (a twenty percent increase),
the discount factor ￿ would increase from 0.394 to 0.396 (i.e., by approximately 0.47 percent). These ￿ndings
are consistent with the ￿ndings of the literature cited above that relates saving to income and with Benjamin,
Brown, and Shapiro (2006), who ￿nd a "strong, statistically signi￿cant, and positive relationship between
AFQT score and the propensity to have positive net assets" in the NLSY. Those authors, using a di⁄erent
measure of time preference, report "an additional 10 percentile points of AFQT is associated with an increase
of about 1.5 percentage points in the propensity to have positive net assets."
The estimate of ￿5 allows us to derive a value of ￿ for each ability level holding ￿xed an individual￿ s age,
gender, and cumulative income. In particular, we use
￿ = 0:356(AFQT)
0:026 ; (27)
where the constant 0:356 is pinned down by matching the value of ￿ for the middle AFQT quintile from
Table 1 (0:394) with the mean AFQT score in that quintile (49:26). Expression (27) allows us to calculate,
from the average AFQT score by quintile, a "regression-based ￿" for each quintile that can be compared to








21We also have run simulations controlling for the slope of income during the 1979-2004 period and over the past ten years
for each individual. These controls reduce the coe¢ cient on AFQT to 0.021 and 0.015, but it remains signi￿cant at the 1%
level. Note that these results imply a weaker relationship between ability and preferences.
22Measurement error likely a⁄ects both our estimates of ability and discounting, though bias would be introduced only by
error in the former. While AFQT is an imperfect measure of ability, its retest reliability is very high. Moreover, if AFQT
mismeasures ability, it is unclear whether that biases our results down or up. It may be that AFQT measures those parts of
ability that are particularly highly correlated with preferences (i.e., ability to delay grati￿cation, cognitive alacrity), and a more
accurate measure of ability would show less relationship with preferences.
17Table 3. Regression-based ￿ by AFQT quintile
AFQT quintile
Bottom 2 3 4 Top








0.9585 0.9598 0.9603 0.9607 0.9610
Mean wi 12.35 16.29 18.98 21.67 25.39
The ￿nal step is to relate these discount factors to wages, as wage rates are the measure of ability in the
model from Section 2 that we will use to simulate optimal policy. The NLSY provides data on individuals￿
reported wages, and we report the average of these wages by AFQT quintile in Table 3.23 Assuming the same
functional form as in expression (27), the values of ￿
￿
wi￿
and wi in Table 3 imply the following relationship






















for a wide range of wages.
To simulate optimal capital income taxes using the estimated form for ￿
￿
wi￿
in expression (28), we
specify a wage (wi) distribution, calculate the implied values for ￿
￿
wi￿
, and numerically simulate the
planner￿ s problem in (9). We also simulate an augmented planner￿ s problem that limits the planner to no
capital income taxation. This enables us to calculate welfare gains from optimal capital taxation.
We use a wage distribution that starts at $4 and increases in equally-sized discrete bins. Based on Saez
(2001), we assume that the distribution of the population across these wages is lognormal up to $62.50 and
Pareto with a parameter value of 2.68 (following Golosov, Troshkin, and Tsyvinski, 2010b) for higher wages.
We calibrate the lognormal distribution with the 2007 wage distribution for full-time workers in the United
States as reported in the Current Population Survey.
To measure the intertemporal wedge we use the expression:









where r is the annual rate of return to savings.24 The variable ￿ (￿) measures the relative distortion toward
good 1 and away from good 2 at a given income level. Under the capital income tax interpretation, ￿ (￿) is
23We compute wages from the total wage and salary income divided by the total hours worked in 1992, as reported in 1993.
We calculate mean wages by AFQT quintile limiting the sample to workers who reported more than 1,000 hours worked. Using
all workers does not change the pattern, but all wage levels rise because some workers with low reported hours have high
imputed hourly wages.
24In the notation of the model of Section 3, p2 = 1
1+r, as we assume that savings earn a net rate of return r. We set

















r = ￿. The implicit tax ￿ is on net capital income, i.e., the implicit after-tax return to saving (marginal rate of transformation)
is (1 + r (1 ￿ ￿)):
18the implicit tax on the interest income earned on good 2, i.e., capital. If this expression is positive, the tax
policy is discouraging future consumption relative to current consumption. More informally, it is taxing the
return to saving, so we will refer to it as the implied capital income tax.
3.2 Optimal capital income taxes
Figure 1 shows optimal nonlinear capital income tax rates in the baseline case (￿ = 1 and ￿ = 3).









Optimal capital income tax rates
Figure 1: Optimal capital income tax rates in the baseline model
Optimal capital income tax rates are U-shaped (as in Diamond 1998 and Saez 2001). They rise from
$100,000 in annual income, corresponding to a wage of $40 per hour, through the point at which the Pareto
tail of the wage distribution begins, at an income of around $150,000. Above that income level optimal rates
plateau at around 4.5%.
The pattern of optimal rates in Figure 1 can be better understood by examining the components of the
analytical result describing optimal distortions from Section 3: expression (19): In Figure 2A and Figure 2B,









B(wi) under the optimal policy over the income
distribution, which we split at $300,000 to enable easier examination.
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Figure 2: Components of the analytical expression for optimal distortions
These ￿gures show that, as anticipated in Section 3, the di⁄erence between the cross-partial derivatives







19wages increase. The cost-bene￿t ratio of the distortion, represented by
C(w
i)
B(wi) also diminishes with income.
Figure 2A shows that the U-shaped pattern of optimal distortions in Figure 1 is due to the rapid fall and then






term, so that the optimal distortion starts out large, diminishes
quickly as the high population density causes the cost-bene￿t ratio to be relatively larger, and then rebounds
as the rate of decline in
C(w
i)






around $100,000 of income. Figure 2B
shows that these two components decline at a similar rate at higher incomes. This pattern explains why
optimal distortions plateau and are essentially constant at high incomes.
The increasing size of the distortions for most of the wage distribution in Figure 1 may seem to contradict
the intuition discussed above that distorting savings among lower earners will enable more e¢ cient redistri-
bution from higher earners. However, the equilibrium distortions shown in these ￿gures are not the relevant
distortions for an individual claiming an allocation intended for a di⁄erent type (e.g., type i claiming to
be type i ￿ 1). Such an individual has a lower ￿
￿
wi￿
than the type whose allocation he claims, and this
magni￿es the e⁄ective distortion to his intertemporal optimization if he chooses to mimic the lower type.
What matters for individual i￿ s incentives, then, is that the "deviator￿ s distortion" (as de￿ned in Section 1)
he faces if he claims to be type i ￿ 1 is higher than the distortion he faces if he tells the truth. Figure 3
shows the two relevant series: the "deviator￿ s distortion (i0ji)" and the truth-telling distortion to type i.











Figure 3: Deviator￿ s distortion in the baseline model
The deviator￿ s distortion always exceeds the truth-telling distortion, consistent with the analytical results
above. Optimal nonlinear capital income taxation thereby discourages high-skilled individuals, who value
saving, from earning less and claiming a more generous tax treatment.




measure the welfare gain, we ￿rst simulate the optimal policy when capital wedges are constrained to be
zero. The planner designs bundles of total consumption and labor income, rather than of consumption in
each period and labor income, among which individuals choose. Each individual is then free to allocate his
chosen total consumption across periods according to his preferences, with no distortion. This allows us to
calculate the factor by which consumption of all agents in both periods would have to be increased in the
model without capital taxes to yield the same level of social welfare as in the model with the optimal taxes
shown in Figure 1. This factor is 0.00002% of aggregate consumption. The welfare gain is concentrated
20among low earners.
4 Robustness of baseline results
In this section we extensively examine the robustness of the baseline numerical results. We start by con-
sidering social welfare functions other than the Utilitarian function assumed throughout the analysis thus
far; this turns out to have little impact on our results. Next, we vary the two key parameters of the utility











that the former matters very little while the latter substantially a⁄ects the magnitude of optimal capital
income tax rates but has little e⁄ect on the welfare gains from optimal policy. Finally, we compare the
degree of preference heterogeneity we observe in the data to that needed to justify a range of average capital
tax rate levels.25
4.1 Alternative social welfare functions
The Utilitarian social welfare function, in which individual types are valued by the social planner according
to their proportions of the total population, is a natural choice. As Vickrey (1945) and Harsanyi (1953, 1955)
argued, a Utilitarian social welfare function is equivalent to the expected utility function of an individual
in an ex ante state when he is uncertain over his type. It is also a key benchmark in modern optimal tax
studies.
Nevertheless, we may be interested in social welfare functions that are more redistributive than the
Utilitarian benchmark. Social welfare functions that are concave in individual utilities are a common












where ￿ parameterizes the concavity of social welfare and where ￿ = 1 for a Utilitarian social welfare function.
We consider two more concave versions of expression (31), where ￿ = 0:5 and ￿ = 0:25.
The baseline results for optimal capital income taxes turn out to be robust to these di⁄erent assumptions
on social preferences. Figure 4 shows optimal rates for these three social welfare functions under our baseline
parameter assumptions of ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 3.
25We have also checked the robustness of our results to the number of periods in the model. Numerical simulations that allow
for more than two periods, with one consumption good per period, show that optimal distortions are nearly constant across
time.













r = 0.25 (Highly redistributive case)
r = 0.5  (Intermediate case)
r = 1.0  (Utilitarian case)
Figure 4: Robustness to varying the social welfare function
The gaps between the optimal rate schedules in Figure 4 are small over the entire income distribution.
The rates for high earners plateau at 4.6%, 4.6%, and 4.5%. The di⁄erences are slightly larger at lower
wage levels, as the planner maximizing a more concave social welfare function uses larger distortions on low
earners￿consumption choices to enable greater incentive-compatible transfers to them.
4.2 Elasticity of labor supply
The Frisch elasticity of labor supply equals 1
￿￿1 in our model. The baseline assumption of ￿ = 3:0 implies
an elasticity of 0:5, consistent with the evidence in Chetty (2010). Figure 5 shows optimal capital income
tax rates for this baseline value and two alternative values: ￿ = 1:5 implies an elasticity of 3:0, while ￿ = 6:0
implies an elasticity of only 0:2:













s = 1.5 (High elasticity)
s = 3.0 (Baseline)
s = 6.0 (Low elasticity)
Figure 5: Robustness to varying the elasticity of labor supply
Despite the wide variation in labor supply elasticities covered by Figure 5, there are only minor di⁄erences
in optimal capital income tax rates. At high income, the optimal rates plateau at similar rates, and there is
a steep increase beginning around $100,000 of annual income. The only sizeable di⁄erence is for the lowest
skilled, who face high rates when the labor supply elasticity is high and low rates when it is low. The
22explanation for this pattern lies in the planner￿ s use of intertemporal distortions as a substitute for marginal
labor income taxes. When the labor supply elasticity is low, labor income taxes are less distortionary, so
the planner does not need to distort the intertemporal margin to provide incentives for the high skilled to
exert e⁄ort. When the elasticity of labor supply is high, capital income taxes serve a more important role
in encouraging work.
4.3 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution equals 1
￿ in our model. The baseline assumption of ￿ = 1 is a
standard benchmark in mainstream optimal tax and macroeconomic models. But there is substantial debate
over the true value of this parameter, so we explore its e⁄ects on our baseline results by considering three




same procedure described in Section 3.1. Figure 6 shows optimal rates under these di⁄erent assumptions
on ￿:









g = 3.0 (Lowest IES)
g = 2.0 (Low IES)
g = 1.0 (Baseline)
g = 0.5 (High IES)
Figure 6: Robustness to varying the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
Figure 6 shows that varying the intertemporal elasticity of substitution has substantial e⁄ects on optimal
capital income tax rates. For a low intertemporal elasticity (￿ = 3), optimal rates rise to 23.5%, while for
a high intertemporal elasticity (￿ = 0:5) they rise to only 1.6%. The baseline case plateaus at 4.5%.
For the planner considering the use of optimal capital taxes, a low intertemporal elasticity of substitution
means that individuals￿intertemporal allocations will change little in response to distortions. Moreover, the
incentive e⁄ects of these distortions will be strong, as individuals are eager to avoid allocations that distort
them away from their preferred allocations. These factors explain the high optimal capital income tax rates
when ￿ = 3, and similar reasoning explains the low rates when ￿ = 0:5.
Though a low intertemporal elasticity can generate substantially higher optimal tax rates, the welfare
gains of moving from no capital taxation to the optimum remain negligible regardless of ￿.
Further robustness checks in which we vary the elasticity of labor supply, the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, and the social welfare function together reinforce the lesson that optimal capital income tax
rates are substantially larger than in the baseline case only when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
( 1
￿) is small.
234.4 Comparing optimal to existing capital income taxes
Finally, we explore how sensitive our results are to the form of ￿
￿
wi￿
. In particular, we compare our
estimate of the empirical relationship between time preferences and ability to that which would be required
to justify a given level of capital income taxes. This examines the robustness of our results to the strength
of the relationship between preferences and ability.
We calculate the ￿
￿
wi￿
functions that yield population-weighted average optimal intertemporal wedges












where   and " are scalars. We ￿x ￿
￿
wi￿
at its value for wi = $28 to ensure comparability of these preferences
to our empirical estimates. Then, we use the wage (wi) distribution and utility function (25) from Section
3 with ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 3, and we vary the values of   and " in (32) while simulating the planner￿ s problem
in (9); (10), and (11).
Leading studies ￿nd that tax rates on capital income in developed economies today are over 40% .26
Figure 7 plots the ￿
￿
wi￿
required for the population-weighted average optimal intertemporal wedge to




analysis of the NLSY data.














i) for 10% average marginal rate
a(w
i) for 20% average marginal rate
a(w
i) for 40% average marginal rate
Baseline a(w
i)
Figure 7: Preferences ￿
￿
wi￿
required to justify average capital tax rates
To aid intuition, Figure 8 plots the conventional annual discount factor ￿
￿
wi￿




26The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 2008) reports average combined corporate and
personal statutory rates on distributed corporate pro￿ts of 42.4 percent in 2007, down from 50 percent in 2000. An alternative
measure is the "tax ratio" of capital income tax revenue to total capital income. Carey and Rabesona (2004) calculate the tax
ratio for capital income across sixteen OECD countries in 2000 to be 46.3.









i) for 10% average marginal rate
b(w
i) for 20% average marginal rate
b(w
i) for 40% average marginal rate
Baseline b(w
i)
Figure 8: Preferences ￿
￿
wi￿
required to justify average capital tax rates
As these ￿gures make clear, the empirical relationship between time preferences and ability is far weaker
than that which would justify the capital income tax rates prevailing in developed economies today, given
our baseline calibration with ￿ = 1. For example, to justify a 20% capital income tax rate, the discount
rate27 would need to be more than 200% larger for an individual at the twentieth percentile of the ability
distribution than for an individual at the eightieth percentile. The NLSY data implies only a 12% gap
between these two individuals.
5 Extension: Optimal Capital Taxation when Stochastic Abilities
are Related to Preferences
In this section, we extend our analysis of optimal capital taxation when preferences vary with ability to a
stochastic setting in a simple environment. The environment below parallels the dynamic Mirrlees model
similar to, for example, Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003), Albanesi and Sleet (2006), and Golosov,
Tsyvinski and Werning (2006). While di⁄erent from the model analyzed in previous sections, the model here
addresses an additional aspect of how optimal taxes ought to respond to a relationship between preferences
and ability.
In period t = 1, agents have a common ability level w = 1, consume a good x, and produce income
y. In period t = 2, agents have abilities wi that take one of two values (i = fl;hg for low and high) with
probability ￿i :
P
i ￿i = 1, consume two goods c1 and c2; and produce income yi. Let wh > wl > 0. Abilities
are private information to the agent. Importantly, agents with the high second-period ability have a relative





< 0, just as in the previous sections.








































25subject to the budget constraint







where (1 + r) is the marginal rate of transformation of goods across periods.
The individual allocations satisfy standard stochastic Euler equations:28














































subject to the feasibility constraint








































which says that the high-ability agents do not choose to mimic the low-ability agents in the second period 29
Let ￿ denote the multiplier on the incentive compatibility constraint (35).
The ￿rst-order conditions of the planner￿ s problem yield a condition describing optimal policy:




















Result (36) is the Inverse Euler Equation, and it is the same condition that describes optimal policy when
preferences do not vary across types. Thus, the planner￿ s optimal policy toward saving is una⁄ected by the
relationship between stochastic ability and the preference for goods when the planner is able to use nonlinear,
income-dependent commodity taxes.
How does the optimal policy treat consumption choices in the second period? De￿ne ￿
i as the distortion
28An equivalent expression combining the second-period commodities could be used, instead.
29As in the previous Sections, we assume that only the high ability agent can pretend to be the low ability agent and not
vice versa.














In the Appendix, we show that the optimal policy is the same as that from our analysis of optimal capital
taxation in previous sections. In particular, the high type faces no distortion to its commodity choices
(￿
h = 1), while the low type is distorted away from the good that the high-type relatively prefers (￿
l > 1).
6 Conclusion
Among others, Mirrlees (1976) and Saez (2002) have argued that goods preferred by the high-ability ought to
be taxed as part of an optimal tax policy that seeks to redistribute toward the individuals with (unobservable)
low ability. Recently, the logic for taxing goods preferred by those with high ability has been used to argue
for positive capital income taxation, for example by Banks and Diamond (2008).
We study the case for nonlinear taxes on goods justi￿ed by a relationship between ability and preferences
over them. We derive an analytical result characterizing the optimal distortion to consumption choices and
decompose it into both conventional and novel factors. Then, we calibrate a model economy to micro data
that allows us to estimate savings preferences and their relationship to measured ability. When we simulate
optimal policy given these estimates, we ￿nd that the magnitude of optimal capital income taxes is modest￿
only 2% on average and 4.5% on high earner￿ for our baseline case with a unit intertemporal elasticity of
substitution. The welfare gains from these taxes are small. These results are robust to variation in the social
welfare function￿ s concavity and the elasticity of labor supply. Substantially larger optimal capital income
tax rates are implied if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is lower, though even in that case the
welfare gain from imposing optimal capital income taxes remains small.
277 Appendix
7.1 The Derivation of the General Tax Ratio, expression (19)


























derived using the envelope condition on the individual￿ s utility maximization problem. Using the individual￿ s































To solve for the optimal policy, choose l and ci






























































































































































The expression (39) includes multipliers from the planner￿ s problem. Next, we derive expressions for
them in terms of the model variables. This yields the optimal tax result (19). To do so, we write the
Hamiltonian in terms of only the control and state variables. The individual￿ s budget constraint implicitly





as well as taxes, which themselves depend on these three
































to write the following implicit expression for ci
2:
ci























































































































to derive the expressions (23) and (24)from the main text.
297.1.1 Expression for optimal marginal income taxes
For income taxes, we are interested in the extra tax an individual pays when he earns a dollar of income.






































wi ￿ liuyiyi (￿)
￿
￿p2f (wi) ￿ ￿
￿
uwici
2 (￿) ￿ liuyici
2 (￿)
￿ :
Denote the labor wedge relative to good 2 as ￿l;c2: Then, using the results (23) and (24), we can write:




























































Using expressions (20), (21), and (22), this simpli￿es to:















Note that if A2
￿
wi￿




Applying (19) to (40) yields the parallel result for the labor wedge relative to good 1 (￿l;c2):


















< 0, the labor wedge is greater than if there is no relationship between preferences and
ability.
7.2 Estimating time preference from NLSY data
Our measure of preferences will be the discount factor implied by using NLSY data on income and net worth
in a simple model of individual optimization . Suppose individuals live for three periods. In the ￿rst two
periods, roughly corresponding to ages 20 through 42 and 43 through 65, they work, consume, and borrow
or save. In the third period, they are retired and live for 23 years (for simplicity, as this makes all three



















(y1 ￿ c1)R2 + (y2 ￿ c2)
￿
R ￿ c3 = 0:
30where ct and yt are consumption and income in period t; ￿ is the discount factor across 23-year periods (i.e.,
if the one-year-ahead discount factor is ￿, then ￿ = ￿
23), R = (1:05)
23 is the average return to saving over
a 23-year period, and v (￿) is an unspeci￿ed function for the disutility of earning income.
We make the assumption that an individual￿ s total value of income prior to age 43 is identical to the
income it will earn from age 43 until retirement. In the notation of the model, we assume y1 = y2 for all



















































As expected, the higher is income relative to consumption, the greater the estimated ￿ for an individual. We
drop 37 individuals whose estimated ￿ is negative or exceeds two in the ￿ = 1 speci￿cation, leaving 7,008
observations.
To estimate ￿, we need values for y1 and c1 for each individual. For y1, we use the NLSY￿ s observations on
income over time for each individual to calculate the "future value" of income earned prior to and including
2004. We do not observe income in all years for each individual. To obtain an income ￿gure comparable
to ending net worth for each individual, we calculate the future value of the observed incomes for each
individual. Then, we scale that future value by the maximum number of years observable over the number
of years observed for each individual. We also do not observe initial net worth. However, if we control for






23(2004￿t)yt. Using the full time series of income rather than simply the most
recent observation of income is important for two reasons. First, it gives a better measure of the individual￿ s
likely lifetime or permanent income. Second, to calculate c1, we assume that any income not accumulated
as net worth by 2004 was consumed. Formally, we denote the NLSY variable "family net worth" NW and
calculate c1 = y1 ￿ NW.
Our data do not include components of individuals￿expected future income, such as Social Security
payments or other social transfers. To the extent that these omissions bias down the estimate of net worth,
we will understate saving rates. Therefore, if these transfers are progressive, we will be overestimating the
slope of discount factors versus ability. In a similar way, expected future gifts and inheritances are not taken
into account in the data. To the extent that these are increasing in recipient income, we are underestimating
the slope of discount factors versus ability.
Finally, a note on converting the estimates of ￿ into the preferences in expression (25). The following
31equality relates the estimated ￿
￿
wi￿
















is related to the model￿ s representation of preferences, denoted ^ ￿
￿
wi￿


























































, where ￿i is the population proportion of type i. This re￿ ects










7.2.1 Utility function normalization, expressions (25) and (26)
Here, we detail the normalization of preferences in the expression (25). The goal is to scale the preferences
across goods so that they do not mechanically a⁄ect labor e⁄ort. For an example of such an e⁄ect, consider


































with multiplier ￿. Substituting the individual￿ s ￿rst order conditions into the budget constraint yields the
















































































In this case, the chosen income level yi
t depends on preferences.
We wish to avoid that dependence, so we specify preferences in a way that will cause each individual￿ s














































This is a generalization of (25) to T rather than 2 time periods. Substituting the individual￿ s ￿rst order















































































































With this normalization, the choice of e⁄ort does not depend on preferences.



























33These normalized utility functions are used in the main paper.
7.3 Dynamic Model, result (36)
The planner￿ s problem is stated in the main text. The ￿rst-order conditions are:






























































































































These ￿rst order equations also imply no distortion on the consumption choices in period 2 of the high type
but a distortion to the choices of the low type, just as in the simple two-type model in the main text.
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